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INTRODUCTION

On June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
v. UnitedStates finally told us that Mirandawarningsare here to
Dickerson
1
stay.

decision a "stunning and
Professor Stephen Schulhofer called the
2
humiliating defeat" for Miranda'sopponents.
True.
3
Professor Yale Kamisar called the decision "wondrous."
Well, let's not get carried away.
This was hardly a nail-biter. Let's recall that both the defense and the
government agreed that the Court should re-affirmMiranda;the Court was
t Professor, The John Marshall Law School. I wish to acknowledge the excellent research
provided by Eric Pruitt, J.D. This Essay is dedicated to the memory of my late father, the
Honorable William J. O'Neill, whose devotion to lawv and justice serves as a constant
inspiration.
1. 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (discussing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
2. Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Upholds Miranda Warning: Once a Critic
Himself,Rehnquist Rebuffs Ruling's Challengers,CGi.TRIB., June 27,2000, at N1.
3. Id.
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4
forced to appoint amicus curiae to argue against it.
Also, let's do some addition: take Justices Souter, Kennedy, and
Stevens who had recently found Miranda issues to be constitutional issues
cognizable in federal habeas corpus;5 add Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
the Clinton appointees; and then add Justice O'Connor with her dramatic
defense of stare decisis in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey.6 That looked like
six fairly solid votes to affirm a 34 year-old precedent that both the defense
and the government supported. And those six, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist assigning himself the opinion, indeed made up the Dickerson
7
majority.
The biggest mystery to the public may have been why the government
supported Miranda, a decision that had 8triggered a firestorm of
prosecutorial and police criticism in the 1960's.

There were several reasons. First, despite Miranda's fame, the fact
remains that 78% of suspects waive their rights and agree to be interrogated
by police without the assistance of a lawyer. 9 This is not whatMiranda's
critics predicted in 1966.10
Second, Miranda has actually simplified prosecutors' efforts to have
confessions declared admissible. Courts have gradually equated observing
Miranda with obtaining a voluntary confession.11 This is wrong. These
should be two entirely separate inquiries. Miranda merely deals with
whether an interrogation should be conducted. The voluntariness test deals
with how an interrogation should be conducted. To use a baseball
metaphor, Miranda deals only with the wind-up; the voluntariness rule
examines the pitch. But courts have a tendency to assume that ifMiranda
4. Professor Paul G. Cassell of the University of Utah College of Law was appointed to
argue as amicus curiae. See Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Confessional; Crime,
Punishment and the Passions ofMiranda, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 2000, available at LEXIS,
News Library, NYT File; see also Linda Greenhouse, Clinton Urges Supreme Court to
Uphold the Miranda Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, available at LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File.
5. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
6. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Justice O'Connor, of course, was joined by Justices Souter and
Kennedy in the joint opinion).
7. 530 U.S. 428.
8. See, e.g., Fred E. Inbau, "PlayingGod": 5 to 4 (The Supreme Court and the Police),
57 J. CRIim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377 (1966), reprinted in 89 J. CRIn. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1441 (1999).
9. Richard A. Leo, CriminalLaw: Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Justice White's dissent that predicted a large decrease in the number of
confessions. Miranda,384 U.S. at 526 (White, J., dissenting).
11. Timothy P. O'Neill, One Down, Two to Go-In Top of First, CmI. DAILY LAW

BULL., July 14, 2000, at 5.
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is followed, then the analysis is over and the confession is admissible.
This is borne out by the fact that despite the dozens ofMirandacases
decided by the Supreme Court during the last 35 years, 12 the Court has only
twice found a confession involuntary. 13 In Dickerson, the Court repeated
an observation it first made in 1984: "[c]ases in which a defendant can
make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was
'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to
14
the dictates of Miranda are rare."
There is no reason why this should be true. Assume the police
properly obtain a Miranda waiver prior to interrogation. They then use
electric cattle prods to obtain the confession. The fact thatMiranda was
diligently followed does not make the resulting confession any less
involuntary and inadmissible. Again, Miranda deals only with the windup, not the pitch.
Thus, the federal government in Dickerson was happy to accept
Miranda. Prosecutors have grown to like the fact that following Miranda's
formalistic rules almost invariably leads to admission of the confession.
Moreover, the vast majority of suspects do not choose to invoke Miranda's
protections anyway.
Which leads to the more serious question: why after all these years do
suspects persist in waiving Mirandaand confessing to the police?
An OP-ED article written by a criminal defense lawyer several days
after Dickerson was decided argued that "the most popular reason for
confessing is the Oprah phenomenon."'1 5 She stated that of the hundreds of
defendants she has represented, every one who was told by police of his
right to remain silent waived that right.16 She credits
this to the age of
17
confessional talk shows such as "Oprah Winfrey."'
I am not so sure. Blaming Oprah Winfrey assumes that there is a long
tradition of silence by suspects in the face of questioning by authorities.
This is simply not true.
In trying to understand why so many suspects 'waive their Miranda
12. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Justice Scalia, in his dissent
in Dickerson, states that the Supreme Court has decided "nearly 60 cases" involving
Miranda issues. 530 U.S. at 463 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
13. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978).

14. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433
(1984)).

15. Erica S. Per], It Feels So Good To Confess, N.Y. TIMEs, July 6,2000, at A25.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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rights, this Essay focuses on two of the Miranda warnings. First, it argues
that "the right to remain silent" is a relatively recent gloss on the Fifth
Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself.
Drawing on new scholarship, it shows that remaining silent in the face of
accusatory questioning is counter-intuitive.
Expecting that a verbal
warning perfunctorily given by a police officer will result in a suspect in
custody refusing to respond to interrogation is simply naive.
Second, it will then examine Miranda'spromise of the right to the
assistance of counsel. It will consider two modem literary classics that are
full-length confessions. Drawing on these works, as well as other literary
and psychological sources, it will contend that anyone who confesses is a
fortiori "making his case," thus acting in the role of his own attorney.
Since every confessant is by definition acting as his own attorney, the right
to assistance of counsel might appear superfluous to the suspect. Indeed,
this Essay contends that police interrogation procedures deliberately play
on this fact; police will pretend to help a suspect "make a case for himself,"
thus creating the illusion that assistance of counsel is unnecessary.
Miranda is a landmark attempt to level the playing field in the police
interrogation room. But defense attorneys now find themselves supporting
a prosecution-endorsed set of rights that are waived by 78% of those who
are supposed to benefit.
After 35 years, it is time to take a closer look.
I.

"You HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT"

Perhaps the most famous of the Miranda warnings also happens to be
the first: "You have the right to remain silent." 18 When suspects on
television or in the movies are taken into custody, this is the warning you
clearly hear as the officer handcuffs the suspect and leads him away.
If educated lay people were polled, I would wager that a majority
actually believe that this language is taken verbatim from the Bill of Rights.
In fact, I would not be surprised if some lawyers and judges would agree.
The source of the "right to remain silent" is found, of course, in the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." 19 This "privilege against
self-incrimination" is a concept that goes back several centuries in AngloAmerican law.
Yet recent scholarship contends that the "right to remain silent"

18. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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component of the privilege is of a much more recent vintage. 20 This has
great significance for understanding the overwhelming number of suspects
who choose to talk with the police despite Mirandawarnings. Remaining
silent in the face of accusations is not the centuries - old right some have
claimed it to be. Indeed, the fact that 78% of suspects receivingMiranda
warnings choose to speak may actually suggest that silence in the face of
accusation is positively counter-intuitive. 2 1 Before blaming Oprah Winfrey
for talkative suspects, it is important to examine the historical background
of the "right to remain silent."
A.

The TraditionalStory

The standard account of the development of the "right to remain
22
silent" can be found in the work of John Wigmore and Leonard Levy.?3
Ecclesiastical courts in sixteenth century England sought to stamp out
religious dissent.24 One tool the courts used was the ex officio oath.25 This
enabled the religious court to summon a person and force him to take an
oath prior to questioning him concerning his religious beliefs. 26 No formal
charge of heresy was needed to force the person to testify under oath.
This was serious business indeed. Oaths in the sixteenth century
possessed an extraordinarily solemn quality which perhaps is somewhat
lacking today. A person who took an oath and lied often believed he would
lose his immortal soul. 27 Conversely, a person who refused to take the oath
28
could be imprisoned for contempt.
Wigmore credits change in the law to people such as John Lilbume,
who spoke out against these courts-including Star Chamber-and their
procedures between 1637 and 1641.29 One principle the critics relied on
was "nenzo tenetur prodere seipsumn," translated from the Latin as "no
person is to be compelled to accuse himself." In response, a 1641 statute

20. See infra notes 69-98 and accompanying text.
21. Leo, supra note 9, at 276.
22. See JOHNH. VIGMORE, EvIENCE1rNTRIAsAT CO.MM\ON LAW § 250 (1940).
23. See LEONARD NV. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFH A
SELF-INCRImNATION (1986).

iENDm\r THE RIGHT AGAtusr

24. R.H. HELMHOLZ, The Privilege and the Ius Commune: The Middle Ages to the
Seventeenth Century, THm PRIVILGE AGAINST SEU'-INCRBIENATION 18,29 (1997).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Albert IV. Alschuler, A PeculiarPrivilege in HistoricalPerspcctive,in HEILHOLZ,
supranote 24 at 187, 191.
28. John H. Langbein, 7he Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The
Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuriesin HEiF1HOLZ, supra note 24, at 101.
29. Id. at 102.
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30
abolished these courts and the ex officio oath.
Wigmore and Levy contend that the principle that no man should be
compelled to accuse himself was then applied to the common law courts as
well.3 1 Wigmore states that by 1685 "there is no longer any doubt" that the
principle applied to all courts in England.3 2 Levy agreed, saying that by the
early 1700's the privilege against self-incrimination "prevailed supreme" at
the English common law trial.33

B.

The RevisionistAccount
34
Revisionist historians have recently taken issue with this account.
First, they contend that the "nemo tenetur" principle has its roots not in
England, but rather on the Continent.35 And the value underlying the
principle was not the right to silenceper se, but rather the right not to be
interrogated under oath unless there was a sound basis for an accusation.
R. H. Helmholz traces the origin of "nemo tenetur" to the jus
commune, the mixture of medieval canon law and Roman law that
dominated legal thought in Europe in the Middle Ages. 36 The origin of
"nemo tenetur" is obscure. Albert Alschuler refers to speculation that it
may be related to the switch from public confession to private confession
within the Roman Catholic Church.3 7 As Alschuler notes, "[flar from
reflecting the notion that wrongdoers have a right to remain silent, the
privilege against self-incrimination originally may have reflected only a
pragmatic judgment that a sinner's duty did not include public disclosure
that could lead to criminal proceedings against himself."38
By the seventeenth century, Alschuler writes that the "privilege" in
England was actually a "right not to be interrogated under oath in the
absence of well-grounded suspicion." 39 English common law courts at that
time required that criminal defendants be presented with specific charges;
they also forbade placing defendants under oath.40 Yet this tradition was
challenged by the creation of the Court of High Commission. 41 This court
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
WIJGMORE, supra note 22, vol. 8, sec. 2250, at 289-90.
LEvY, supra note 23, at 325.
See generally HELMHOLZ, supra note 24.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-46.
Alschuler, supra note 27, at 186.
Id.

39. Id.
40. Id.

41. HELMHOLZ, supra note 24, at 42.
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was founded for the specific task of suppressing religious dissent in
England.4 2 Unlike the common law courts, the High Commission was
allowed to proceed against individuals without any formal charges.4 3 Also,
individuals were forced to answer under oath.44 When those called before
the High Commission challenged the procedures, English common law
courts ordered that the High Commission could not question individuals
without a specific basis for the investigation.4 5 Nevertheless, in 1607 it
was held that the High Commission could continue to place individuals
under oath, provided that the Commission gave them sufficient notice of
the charges.46
Note that what was at stake was not some amorphous right to remain
silent; rather, it was the right of a person not to be questioned unless the
questioner had a clear basis for suspicion. Kent Greenawalt has written on
this issue of silence in the face of questioning. 47 In his articleSilenceAs a
Moral and ConstitutionalRight, Greenawalt sharply distinguishes between
the legitimacy of the invocation of silence in different factual scenarios. 4 s
On the one hand, he posits a situation where a theft has occurred and, with
no grounds for suspicion, the victim asks Betty to account for her activities
argues that Betty has a moral
during the time in question. 4 9 Greenawalt
50
right to say, "None of your business."
On the other hand, Greenawalt poses an alternative hypothetical
where the victim is told that Betty has been seen wearing a bracelet that
looks very much like one that had been stolen from her.51 In this case,
Greenawalt argues, the victim would be on firmer moral ground by asking
Betty about this information, and Betty would have reason to respond.5 2 If
Betty refused to respond to the victim's questions under these
the victim would be justified in
circumstances, Greenawalt contends that
53
viewing Betty with increased suspicion.
Thus, Greenawalt distinguishes silence in the face of a fishing

42. Id.
43. Alschuler, supra note 27, at 187.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 188-90.
46. Id.
47.
REv. 15
48.
49.

Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moraland ConstitutionalRight, 23 VNI.& NlARY L
(1981).
Id.
Id. at 21-22.

50. Id
51. Id. at 22-23.

52. Id
53. Id.
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expedition from silence in the face of well-grounded suspicion. 54 And,
Alschuler notes, this is the distinction that in fact was made during the
seventeenth century fight against the High Commission's use of the ex
officio oath.55 The issue was not silence per se, but rather the right
to
56
remain silent when the interrogator had no well-grounded suspicion.
As to the eighteenth century American experience, Alschuler
concedes that the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth
Amendment was different in scope from the "nemo tenetur" principle
enforced by the English common law courts against the High
Commission. 57 Yet Alschuler argues that even in the Fifth Amendment the
58
right "not to be compelled" did not mean an actual right to remain silent.
Rather, "compelled" meant just that-the right not to beforced to speak.5 9
This meant that torture could not be used; it probably meant that the
government could not engage in coercive tactics such as threats of
punishment and promises of leniency.
It also meant that a person could not be interrogated under oath.
Americans, like the English, treated oaths with great reverence. 60 The
combination of both civil and religious sanctions involved with violating
oaths led to6 the
conclusion that placing a person under oath was per se
1
compulsion.
Again, this should not be equated with some general "right to remain
silent." In the eighteenth and continuing well into the nineteenth century,
there was no real "right to remain silent" either in American pre-trial
criminal proceedings or at the American criminal trial itself.
As to pre-trial proceedings, Eben Moglen has shown that, following
English practice, it was common in the colonies to take an arrested person
before a justice of the peace for questioning. 62 At this "preliminary
examination," the justice of the peace would ask questions, transcribe the
63
answers, and this information would be passed on for use at the later trial.
"'Nemo tenetur" forbade examining the person under oath and forbade the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Alschuler, supra note 27, at 189-90.
Id.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 192.
Id.

60. Id. at 196.

61. Id.
62. Eben Moglen, The Privilege in British North America: The ColonialPeriodto the
Fifth Amendment, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION 109, 114-22 (1997).

63. Id. at 117.
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use of torture. 64 But this unswom, pre-trial interrogation of a criminal
defendant-a practice that had its roots in sixteenth century England-was
meant to encourage the making of confessions. 65 A defendant could
theoretically remain mute before the questioning of the justice of the
peace. 66 But this meant that his silence would then be reported to the
prosecutors and could be used against him at trial.6 7
Moglen describes the concept of a "right to remain silent" at this stage
to be a chimera, because "[a]t the center of that system stood the defendant,
friendless and alone... [a]ny notion of the privilege against selfincrimination was but a phantom of the law."68
The early American criminal trial similarly rejected the concept of a
defendant's general "right to remain silent." 69 John Langbein has
convincingly argued that the model of a criminal trial in which the
defendant confidently remains silent and challenges the prosecution to
prove him guilty dates back only to the mid-nineteenth century-some 200
years after Levy and Wigmore claim it took effect.70
Before that time, Langbein avers that criminal trials in England and
America were very different from the trials we see today.7 1 He notes three
major differences. 72 The most significant was that until the mid-eighteenth
century defendants in criminal cases were not allowed to have counsel
represent them. 73 When they were finally allowed, defense lawyers were
permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses.7 4 But it was not until
was passed allowing defense counsel to address the
1836 that legislation
75
jury directly.
Secondly, criminal defendants were traditionally restricted in their
ability to call witnesses on their behalf.76 Through the seventeenth century,
77
English criminal defendants were not allowed to call unwilling witnesses.
And those witnesses the defense called could not be sworn, although

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 118-20.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117-22.
Id.
Id. at 122.
Langbein, supra note 28, at 82-108.

70. Id. at 83.
71. Id. at 82.

72. Id. at 83.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 87.

75. Id.
76. Id at 88.
77. Id.
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prosecution witnesses regularly were.
Third, the criminal defendant himself was not allowed to testify under
7
oath. 9 Indeed it was not until 1864 that Maine became the first state to
allow a criminal defendant
to testify under oath; it was not until 1898 that
80
England permitted this.
The upshot of this is that for most of our Anglo-American history a
criminal defendant on trial had to speak in his defense; not doing so would
have been, to quote Langbein, "suicidal., 81 Langbein describes this type of
trial as the "accused speaks" trial.82 This makes any discussion of the
"storied history" of the right to remain silent appear suspect.
Langbein calls the current criminal trial the "testing the prosecution"
model.8 3 This model insists that the prosecution must prove each element
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; 84 provides that defense counsel
may cross-examine the state's witnesses and present sworn defense
86
witnesses; 85 and allows defense counsel to argue directly to the jury.
Only with these changes in criminal procedure could the defendant's
silence at trial become a viable option.
Yet one more change was necessary before the "right to remain silent"
could become a reality. Assuming a defendant has a right not to testify at
trial, may his silence be considered by the jury in reaching a verdict?
Interestingly, as late as 1953, the Uniform Rules of Evidence provided that
"[I]f an accused in a criminal action does not testify, counsel may comment
upon accused's failure to testify,
and the trier of fact may draw all
87
reasonable inferences therefrom."
It was not until 1965 that the U.S. Supreme Court held in Griffin v.
California that it was constitutionally impermissible for the prosecutor or
judge to comment on a criminal defendant's failure to testify. 88 This, of
course, was followed the very next year with the Miranda decision that
extended the right to silence to police interrogation rooms.8 9 Thus, it was

78. See George Fisher, The Jury'sRise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575 (1997).

79. Alschuler, supra note 27, at 198.
80. Id.

81. Langbein, supra note 28, at 83.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id. at 89.
85. Id. at 88.

86. Id. at 86.
87. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
UNIF. RULES OF EVIDENCE § 23(4)).

88. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
89. Miranda,384 U.S. at 467-68.
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not until the "one-two punch" of Griffin and Mirandain the 1960's that the
"right to remain silent" became a truly viable alternative.
What does this history have to do with the Miranda warnings? It
should make us remember that, Law Day rhetoric notwithstanding, the
"right to remain silent" is a fight of relatively recent vintage. Historically,
criminal defendants have had to personally defend themselves in the face of
questions and accusations, both before and during trial. 90 And ethically, as
Kent Greenawalt argues, defending oneself in the face of questions based
on well-founded suspicion is an understandable reaction. 91 Indeed, for a
suspect facing questioning by police in a custodial environment, remaining
silent in the face of accusatory questions might be absolutely counterintuitive.
Thus, contrary to Miranda'sassurances, suspects are understandably
wary about relying on some broad "right to remain silent." Under
traditional principles of evidence, silence could be damning.92 For
example, a person's silence in the face of a statement accusing him of a
crime could be construed as a "tacit admission," admissible against him at
trial.9 3 This is "based on the assumption that human nature is such that
innocent persons will usually deny false accusations." 9 4 True, Miranda
may have changed the law in this area; there is currently a split of authority
on whether a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used as
substantive evidence of guilt.95 But since Miranda, even the Supreme
Court has held that a defendant can be cross-examined concerning his
silence prior to arrest or Miranda warnings.96 In addition, the Supreme
post-arrest
Court has also held that a defendant can be impeached with 97
warnings.
Miranda
receiving
his
to
prior
is
it
silence, as long as
Thus, historically, remaining silent in the face of questioning is far
more problematic-and dangerous-than Miranda might suggest. A
combination of these factors-and not the popularity of Oprah Winfreyperhaps has more to do with why 78%
of those receiving Miranda
98
warnings choose to talk with the police.
But this leads to another question. Miranda was groundbreaking in its
Langbein, supra note 28, at 82-108.
Greenawalt, supra note 47, at 27-33.
Langbein, supra note 28, at 83.
JOHN NV. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 160 (1992).
Id.
95. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1996) and cases cited
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

therein.
96. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980).
97. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam).
98. Leo, supranote 9, at 276.
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provision that those in custodial interrogation have the right to counsel. 99
Assuming a suspect chooses to talk with the police, why would he not
accept the generous offer of an attorney by his side?
II.

"You HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN ATrORNEY"

Miranda's final right assures a person in custodial interrogation that
he has the right to an attorney, and that if he cannot afford one, an attorney
will be provided free of charge. 0 0 Even assuming a suspect wants to
respond to police questions, why would he turn down the offer of a lawyer?
To answer this question, let's go back to 1966, the year the Supreme
Court issued Miranda. Within the decade before Miranda, two important
works of literature had dealt with confessions: Albert Camus's novella The
Fall10 1 and Arthur Miller's play After the Fall.10 2 Indeed, each work is a
full-length confession.
A.

After THE FALL, AFTER THE FALL

The Fall is a confession told over a series of meetings in
Amsterdam. 10 3 The narrator, an expatriate Parisian named Jean-Baptiste
Clamence, is speaking to an unidentified person he has met one night in a
bar.10 4 (Although the listener never speaks, Clamence clearly reacts to
comments and facial expressions from him.) 10 5 Clamence's story revolves
around an incident that occurred years earlier in Paris.10 6 While walking
home one night, he heard the cries of a woman who
had jumped into the
08
Seine. 10 7 Clamence's response was to walk away.1
Unlike religious confessants, 10 9 Clamence is seeking no forgiveness.

99. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
100. Id. at 473. In reality, the Miranda promise of a right to counsel is somewhat
illusory. If a suspect asks for counsel, police will usually end all attempts at interrogation.
Since the police know that an attorney will simply tell the suspect not to answer questions, it
is easier to simply stop attempts to interrogate. Nevertheless, suspects are usually not told
this. But see Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989). Thus, this Essay assumes that

when a suspect in custody is informed of his right to counsel during interrogation, the
suspect believes that an attorney will actually be provided if he requests one.
101. ALBERT CAMUS, THE FALL (1956).
102. ARTHuR MILLER, AFTER THE FALL (1964).

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

CAMUS, supra note 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

109. See PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND

LrrERATURE 15-16 (2000).
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Clamence sees the world as a place where innocence is not a possibility. As
he describes it, "we cannot assert the innocence of anyone, whereas we can
state with certainty the guilt of all. Every man testifies to the crime of all
the others-that is my faith and my hope."' 10° Clamence has given up any
hope of expiation. Instead, the function of his confession is to taint the
listener, to spread the guilt, and to implicate everyone. It is no coincidence
that Clamence is ill with "a little fever."'1 11 His guilt, like a disease, is
contagious and infects all around him. As he explains it, "I stand before all
humanity... saying: 'I was the lowest of the low.' Then imperceptibly I
pass, in my speech, from 'I' to 'we'. When I reach, 'this is the way we are',2
the trick is turned, I can tell them off... [W]e're in the soup together." "1
Peter Brooks has characterized Clamence's confession as "clearly a
perversion of the traditional intent of confession.., the outcome of his
confession appears to be a generalized abjection that has no value for
'
spiritual renewal." 13
In the early 1960's, Arthur Miller was asked to write the screenplay
for The Fall.1 14 Although he turned down the job, it gave him the
opportunity to re-read the book. 115 Miller felt the book ended too soon,
and he had a very different take on Clamence's failure to save the girl:
What if the man, at risk to himself, had attempted her rescue and
then discovered that the key to her salvation lay not in him, whatever
his caring, but in her? And perhaps even worse, that strands of his
own vanity as well as his love were entvined in the act of trying to
save her? Did disguised self-love nullify the ethical act? Could
anyone,11in
all truth, really save another unless the other wished to be
6
saved?
Some time later, while Miller was working on a play about Robert
Oppenheimer and the development of the atomic bomb, he became
discouraged about his treatment of the issue of guilt.1 17 He returned to The
Fall:
It was clearer now why [the book] left me unsatisfied; it seemed to
say that after glimpsing the awful truth of one's own culpability, all
one could do was to abjure judgment altogether. But... was it

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

CAMUS, supra note 101, at 110.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 140.
BRooKs, supranote 109, at 165.
ARTHuR MiLLER, TrI~aEaNs 483 (1987).
Id.
Id. at484.
Id.
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really possible to live without discriminating between good and
bad?... [a]nd if we were to lay no more judgments, to what could
we appeal from the hand of the murderer? 1 8
Miller began to write a new play, one that would deal with the
"dynamics of denial itself."'1 19 The structure of the new play thus became
clear to him. He wrote, "[i]nevitably the form... was that of a confession,
since the main character's ...conquest of denial [was] the path into
himself." 120 As the play's themes turned towards Miller's own life- and
his marriage to Marilyn Monroe - he again turned to Camus:
Now the unstated question posed in The Fall was... [h]ow to find
out why one went to another's rescue only to help in [that person's]
defeat by collaborating in obscuring reality from his eyes. The Fall
is the book of an observer; I wanted to write about the participants
12 1 in
such a catastrophe, the humiliated defendants. As all of us are.
His finished play, After the Fall, is a confession by Quentin, a man
whose relationships with women and politics bear some similarity to
Miller's own life. 122 The confession is quite different from Clamence's in
The Fall. Clamence describes his role as that of a "judge-penitent." 123 He
explains this apparent oxymoron by contending that his confession of his
own wrongdoing merely shows that he is no better than all the rest of
humanity-all are guilty, no one is innocent. 124 His confession, rather than
being a show of humility, shows instead his own "superiority" because he
knows he is guilty. As Clamence says, "The more I accuse myself, the
more I have a right to judge you. Even better, I provoke you into judging
yourself, and this relieves me of that much of the burden."12' 5 And the
purpose of all this groveling in guilt is that there is no purpose at all.
Forgiveness is impossible. As Peter Brooks observes, Clamence revels in
empty confession for the sake of empty confession "since confession,
'1 2 6
rather than a now impossible absolution, appears as the end of the road."
Clamence confesses in order to have the right to judge everyone else.
Quentin, however, is the opposite of Clamence; he has spent a lifetime
judging others. His confession comes from the realization that it is now his

118. Id. at 520.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.at 521.
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra note 114.
CAMus, supra note 101, at 138.
Id.
Id. at 140.
BROOKs, supra note 109, at 165.
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turn to be judged. Martin Gottfried has described the core of the play as
"Quentin's recognition that he has been spending his life judging people
and now he must judge himself. Or else mankind-we, the audience127
must judge him. That is why he has come. Thejudge is now on trial.",
Unlike Clamence, Quentin not only finds forgiveness to be a
possibility-he considers it a necessity. Holga, Quentin's third wife,
describes a dream in which her own life appeared to her in the figure of an
"idiot" child: "And I bent to its broken face, and it was horrible... but I
kissed it. I think one must finally take one's life in one's arms.....128 At
the play's conclusion, Quentin concludes that he must confront the "wish to
kill" by "look[ing] into its face when it appears, and with a stroke of loveas to an idiot in the house-forgive it; again and again.., forever?" 129 To
Clamence, forgiveness is an illusion; to Quentin, it is the only way to
continue living.
These are two serious works of art describing two very different
confessions. Yet one similarity needs to be discussed.
Both Clamence and Quentin are lawyers.
Why?
B.

Why Would a Lmvyer Confess?

In the criminal setting, it is assumed that a "police confession" and the
"presence of a lawyer" are mutually exclusive concepts. Over a half
century ago, Justice Jackson stated that "[a]ny lawyer worth his salt will
tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under
any circumstances." 130 Granted, Clamence and Quentin are not technically
confessing to crimes. 13 1 Yet is it just coincidental that these major literary
works dealing with confessions should each have a lawyer as a protagonist?
I would suggest that the use of a lawyer-protagonist by both Camus
and Miller is significant in understanding the very nature of confession. It
may also, ironically, help explain why so many suspects in police custody
waive their Miranda-guaranteed right to a lawyer during interrogation.
127. MARTiN GoTrFRiED, OPENING NIGHTs: THEATER CirrcliS. OF TlE SL'ITES 299
(1969) (emphasis added).
128. MILLER, supra note 102, at 30.
129. Id. at 163.
130. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in part and

dissenting in part).
131. As to Clamence, perhaps a "Good Samaritan" kind of statute might impose some
criminal liability on his omission. But see GEORGE P. FLETcHER, BAsic CoNcEMts OF
CRmuNAL LAW 46 (1998) ("There is not now and there has never been a separate crime of
letting a person drown"). As to Quentin, one can speculate on whether his leftist past ever
ran afoul of McCarthy-era statutes dealing with Communists.
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Peter Brooks' recent book Troubling Confessions13 2 discusses a
valuable insight J.L. Austin has made concerning the dual nature of a
confession. 133 Austin states that each confession has both a constative
aspect and aperformative aspect. 134 The constative aspect is the actual sin
or guilt a person is confessing; the performative aspect is the action
performed by the statement "I confess." 135 For example, Brooks states,
"When one says 'Bless me Father, for I have sinned,' the constative
meaning is: I have committed
sins, while the performative meaning is:
136
sin."
my
of
me
absolve
The performative aspect of confession reminds us that confession
does not exist in a vacuum. It is being "performed" for-and seeks a
response from-another.
The person Clamence is speaking to in
Amsterdam is crucial to Clamence's confession. Letting the girl drown is
the constative portion of the confession. But the performative aspect-the
very reason Clamence is confessing-is to implicate the listener in
universal guilt. So, too, Quentin is presented as actually addressing a
Listener, someone who indeed is responding to him throughout the play.
Quentin both seeks and needs forgiveness from another.
The performative aspect of every confession suggests why both
Camus and Miller chose lawyers as confessants. A confessant-by
definition-is making a case to another. The confessant wants-indeed,
demands-something from the confessor. Who better than a lawyersomeone trained to marshal facts and argument to obtain a specific resultto epitomize this performative aspect of confessions?
Indeed, tile fact that Clamence and Quentin are lawyers should put the
reader on guard. Clamence brags about his skill as an advocate: "I am sure
you would have admired the rightness of my tone.., the persuasion and
warmth, the restrained indignation of my speeches before the court. 13 7 He
also tells us of his "instinctive scorn for judges in general.' 3 8 Both the
listener and the reader have thus been warned. For example, the only
evidence we have that Clamence was both a legendary lawyer and a
legendary lover comes from one source-Clamence himself. Let the
listener beware.
Likewise, Quentin presents himself as a very successful Wall Street
132. BROOKS, supra note 109.

133. Id. at 21 (citing J.L. AusTIN, HOW TO Do TMNGS WI

WORDS (1962)).

134. Id.

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
CAMus, supra note 101, at 17.
Id. at 18.
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lawyer. We are told repeatedly of the brilliant brief he has prepared on
behalf of his friend being hounded for his leftist past. 139 It is true that
Quentin tells the Listener, in the beginning, that he has left the firm and no
longer practices law. He describes despair as realizing that he looked up
one day and realized "the bench was empty;" 140 there was no judge to rule
on the value of his life. He says, "All that remained was the endless
argument with oneself-this pointless litigation of existence before an
empty bench.' 4 1 Yet we should also be wary of Quentin, for he has not
left his role of an advocate behind. For all his protestations about "the
empty bench," Quentin is most pointedly not talking to himself. He is
talking to-and making his case before-the Listener, an unseen person
nevertheless so real that Miller has capitalized the name in the stage
142
directions.
This provides a clue as to why so many suspects decide to talk with
the police without Miranda's offer of the assistance of counsel. For the
performative aspect of every confession guarantees that every confessant is
indeed acting as his own lawyer. The intrinsic nature of confession
demands that each confessant must "present a case" and ask for something
from the confessor, whether that is understanding, forgiveness, or leniency.
This is borne out by Richard Leo's study of police interrogation
techniques. Leo found that one of the most successful techniques police
used in obtaining incriminating evidence from suspects in custodial
interrogation was offering the suspect either a moral justification or
psychological excuse for his behavior. 14 3 This tactic was successful in a
staggering 90% of the interrogations in which it was used. 14 4 In other
words, the police obtain the constative element by suggesting ways the
suspect may improve thepeformative aspect of the confession. The police
pretend they are helping the suspect "be his own lawyer" by suggesting
ways in which he can "present his own case."
145
This is starkly illustrated by David Simon's book Homicide.
Simon, a reporter for the Baltimore Sun, chronicled the inner workings of
the Baltimore Police Department's homicide unit for one year. He
describes a typical homicide interrogation in which the officer says to the

139. MaIER, supranote 102, at 33, 34,43.
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2.
143. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRZI. L. &
CRIMNOLOGY 266 (1996).
144. Id. at 293-94.
145. DAvID SiON, HoMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (1991).
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suspect, "[1]ook, bunk, I'm giving you a chance. He came at you, right?
You were scared. It was self-defense." Simon describes this strategy of
minimizing the seriousness of the offense:
[T]he majority of those who acknowledge their complicity in a
killing must be baited by detectives ... They must be made to
believe that their crime is not really murder, that their excuse is both
accepted and unique, that they will, 146
with the help of the detective, be
judged less evil than they truly are."
The police try to offer a false "Out;" but, as Simon notes, "The Out
leads in."
Again, the police strategy is to invite a suspect to act as his own
lawyer through his confession. A layperson's ignorance concerning legal
doctrines such as accountability 147 and felony murder 14 8 probably results in
many suspects sending themselves to prison. A recent story in Illinois
combined both of these factors. 149 Police questioned Leamon Jordan
concerning the murder of a 17-year-old girl. 150 Jordan told police that he
drove the car for two men who murdered the girl after they abducted her
from a bar. 15 1 Jordan said
he believed he would get a reward for giving the
152
information.
this
police
Jordan probably believed that showing he was in the car would mean
he could not be found guilty of the murder. If so, he was unaware that
principles of "accountability" would make him liable for the murder, even
if he did not personally commit it, if a court found that he had aided and
abetted the others in the crime. Moreover, principles of "felony murder"
could separately hold him liable if the killing occurred in the course of the
underlying felony kidnapping.
Jordan was sentenced to 60 years in prison. 153 The police were never
able to determine whether Jordan really knew the other two men or whether
the other two men knew each other. 154 The other men were never
155
charged.

146. Id. at 197.
147. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/5-2 (2000).
148. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (2000).
149. William Gaines, Inmate Who Said He Lied About Death Loses Plea, CM. TRIB.,
July 22, 2000, at A5.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Id.
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CONCLUSION

It's very clear-Miranda is here to stay. But amid the defense
jubilation, there must be time for some sobering thoughts. Seventy-eight
percent of all suspects in custodial interrogation waive their Miranda
rights. 156 True, some of these waivers undoubtedly result from police
misconduct. Yet this Essay has shown that there are at least two other
reasons that merit attention. First, the Mirandawarning aside, there is no
long-standing Anglo-American tradition in favor of remaining silent in the
face of questioning by authorities when the suspect is not under oath.
Second, the nature of confession encourages the confessant to "act as his
own lawyer" in the performative aspect. Thus, confession by its very
nature may militate against suspects taking advantage ofMiranda's offer of
counsel.
Two cheers for Miranda! But after one-third of a century, let's hold
off on the third cheer until we seriously consider whetherMiranda really is
achieving all we had hoped it would. Now thatMirandais safe, let's move
on to the next issue: How can it be improved?

156. Leo, supra note 9, at 276.
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